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Greetings, and welcome to OneSci's coverage of SfN 2009!
 From October 17th to 21st, OneSci will be proving daily news updates about the interesting happenings inside the McCormick Convention Center during the 2009 annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience. Coverage will include commentary on lectures, daily activities, events, and experiences related to the conference. |
| Coverage may be located through various OnSci research portals -- Editor Contact Information |
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| We've been selected as an official neuroblogger, and aim to bring thoughtful coverage on lectures, posters, symposia...you name it (and maybe even some nightlife). Who are "we?" We are primarily a small collection of graduate students whose paths have crossed through San Diego at one point or another. We are also a friendly bunch. In fact, we would love for you (intelligent, creative, ambitious scientist that you are) to become "we" and join our OneSci network. |
Drug Monkey is already all-over Neuroscience 2009; and in a recent post are being especially critical of the Neurobloggers. I've lurked Drug Monkey a few times, and this makes me excited because the crew is comparable to the infamous anons from /b/ except with graduate degrees.
So if any Drug Monkeys stumble upon this blog, I'd like to point out that OneSci is always open to new members, and would love to recruit your help in covering SfN. Not attending? Let us know if there's something in particular you'd like to see up here. If not, lurk as long as you'd like.
We will try our best to cover as much interesting stuff as possible, but ss one DM points out...
| “ | 8 bloggers? If they post on 3500 abstracts each, they'll have the conference nicely covered. -BSCI | ” |
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Over 50 years ago, the scientific community was introduced to the fascinating case of Henry Molaison. Better known to neuroscientists by the initials HM, Molaison lost function of his hippocampus following surgery for intractable seizures, rendering him unable to form any new (conscious) memories. But HM was not completely devoid of all memory. In fact, his memory for childhood events was rather keen, suggesting that this hippocampus structure may be necessary for forming new memories, but may not be where memories are ultimately stored. And thus began a massive effort to understand the role of the hippocampus
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The research, authored by Restivo et al, examined the time course of spine formation in the hippocampus and anterior cingulate cortex following contextual fear learning in mice. Based on the widely held hypothesis that declarative memories are “formed” in the hippocampus and slowly transferred to the cortex and other structures (where they are ultimately stored), one might predict that spine density would be increased in the hippocampus soon after learning, and in the cortex only following a long delay (that is, after the memory no longer requires the hippocampus for retrieval). (Confused???). Not one to disappoint, Restivo et al showed that this is indeed the case. 
markonann said ...
13:15, 10 July 2011 (PDT)
Anybody interested in forex trading should take a look at this video. In the video he mentions a forex trading site... which in my opinion is the best site for currency trading. Have a look and you'll see what I mean --> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnzESCa6vD8
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There is an advertisement on the Science homepage that sometimes catches my eye. The little sliver of an ad features a couple of gummy-looking dudes all running to some elusive goal, with the caption underneath, “It’s not just what you know, but when you know it.” Hard to argue with that. In science, if you’re second, well you’re just replicating someone else’s work, and good luck getting that published. It doesn’t matter if your path was independent of that other guy, he’ll still get all the credit (just ask Alfred Russel Wallace). And it’s not just in science, but in business, medicine, and even mate selection (sorry gals, taken). So it seems that in this world there’s not just a premium on knowing, but knowing as soon as possible. And apparently this holds for monkeys staring at strange shapes while strapped to a chair.
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In a recent study published in Neuron, Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka delivered either large or small juice rewards to monkeys while different shapes flashed on a computer screen in front of them. Although the number of small and large rewards was held constant, the monkeys could learn the magnitude of the next reward if they so desired. The monkeys almost always chose to learn the identity of the impending reward ahead of time, despite not being able to alter the outcome in anyway by doing so. Furthermore, monkeys elected to learn this information as early on in the trial as possible. This, by itself, would not be too noteworthy. Advanced knowledge could be used for preparatory actions, or at least to relieve any anxious uncertainty about the trial’s outcome. However, the authors were also recording from midbrain dopamine neurons (a system which you may recall from a previous post here on The Axon).  We have long known that the degree of activation of these midbrain neurons depends on the rewarding value of a stimulus (although other hypotheses that dismiss a dopaminergic role in reward processes do exist). Thus, it is no surprise that the level of activity of these midbrain neurons was correlated with the magnitude of the reward. What is new, however, is that these same neurons also showed increased firing whenever the monkey was given the chance to learn about the level of the upcoming reward. One might liberally interpret this as the acquisition of advanced knowledge being an intrinsically rewarding event (or at least the opportunity to acquire such knowledge). So, it seems that not only do we seek out knowledge in a timely manner to avoid being scooped by our closest competitor, but such information seeking may be inherently wired into our behavior.
Bradley Monakhos said ...
18:37, 28 July 2009 (PDT)
I was just going to write that...
Jeremy Biane said ...
22:30, 29 July 2009 (PDT)
Scooped!
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Love it or hate it, the Morris Water Maze is a staple of most memory labs. If you’re a PI, you probably love it. If you’re a graduate student, undergrad, technician, or any other poor soul that actually has to run the damn thing, it’s very likely that you hate it. And for how widespread its use is, it certainly has many, many limitations. Don’t tell me that plunking a rat into a pool of milky water, with an invisible platform as his only means for escape, is a pure measurement of spatial memory. The stress alone is enough to confound your measurement. But as the saying goes, it’s the worst test for spatial memory we have, except for every other test in existence…
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And amidst this backdrop, the creator of the Morris Water Maze, the (in)famous Richard Morris, took the stage for the SfN Presidential Special Lecture last Sunday (Oct 18). Part of me was anticipating some disgruntled grad student start chucking wet rats at the stage, while another was excited to hear the musings from one of the greatest minds in the field. But I began to lose interest in both prospects as he slowly trudged through decades of memory research with his punctilious British accent. I’m glad I held on though, because when past gave way to present, he introduced some very exciting research that challenges what some consider dogma in learning and memory research. Basically, he set out to refute two long-held beliefs by claiming: 1) under particular scenarios, memories can be formed to weak, sub-threshold input (that is, input unable to form a memory by itself); and 2) cortical learning – which is believed to take place only after many repetitions or long durations of time – can be rapidly acquired if new learning is integrated into a previously held network of cortical memories (i.e., an existing schema). The first statement I didn’t find that revolutionary, as we’ve known for a long time that super-threshold stimuli paired with sub-threshold stimuli can cause a memory for the weak stimuli to be formed. However, his interpretation was quite different and actually rather novel. The claim? Memory formation requires both a tag and interacting ligands. The former can be elicited by strong or weak stimulation. In contrast, only strong stimulation can bring about the latter. The evidence? LTP was blocked (via CaMKII inhibition) in strongly stimulated pathways. However, when a weak stimulus was applied at a later time point in a separate pathway, this weakly stimulated synapse was potentiated. The explanation? The strong stimulation causes expression of ligands that interact with CaMKII, leading to LTP. Usually, weak stimulation does not lead to ligand creation (or perhaps ligand liberation). But because the ligands were available due to the previous strong stimulation (and perhaps still present because they were inhibited from binding within the “strong pathway”), they bound to tags present in the weak pathway, leading to potentiation of theses synapses. Beautiful. His second claim employed a clever behavioral paradigm that would take too long to get into here (good news though: it in no way involves water). But the gist is that if animals are able to integrate new information into an existing, well-learned schema, then this new knowledge can be incorporated into the cortex very rapidly. This learning is still hippocampal-dependent, however, as lesioning the hippocampus before or directly after the task abolishes learning. But the role of the hippocampus is remarkably transient (only a day or so, I believe). After delighting us with these recent insights, he moved toward the future of memory research, and, like all great scientists before him, he has set his sights on locating the legendary engram. And while I’m hopeful that he will bring about great advances in this ongoing search, like all great scientists before him, he will probably fail to find it (as I’m sure I will if I ever take up the learning and memory torch that intrigues me so). So, there you have it. Despite creating one of the most hated behavioral tests of our time – and being British – his brilliance and keen intellect is undeniable (just kidding, Brits). No real surprise, of course, but it’s exciting when giants of the field still have some tricks up their sleeve.
Write the rest of your news article here, not to be mistaken for the .
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G Protein-Coupled Receptors (GPCRs) are my favorite receptors in the whole wide world. Their versatility allows them to modulate a remarkable number of signaling pathways; environmental stimuli such as light, neurotransmission signals like acetylcholine, and hormonal stimuli such as adrenaline, all utilize GPCRs.
GPCRs are localized on plasma membranes and activated by extracellular ligands. However, recent studies have opened the door to the possibility that GPCRs exist and function INSIDE the cell -- HOW THE! -- is exactly what a group from Washington University in St. Louis (a.k.a. Wash-U) has been exploring...
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 A subclass of glutamate receptors (mGluR5) have been shown to be located on intracellular and nuclear membranes of striatal neurons and HEK cells. The question arises as to what are the signals that mobilize mGluR5 to the nuclear vs. the plasma membrane. Using chimeras (mGluR5 - and a related plasma membrane receptor - GABABR2), the Wash-U trio of Ismail Sergin, Vikas Kumar and Karen O’Malley determined that a string of amino acids located near the mGluR5 C-terminus play an important role in localizing or retaining this receptor on inner nuclear membranes. They speculate that this region might be involved in a process that actively weaves it through the nuclear surface.
How are GPCRs located inside the cell activated? Using sponge constructs that buffer IP3 signaling, they experimentally determined that glutamate most likely is able to traverse cell membranes and activate these intracellular receptors. How bout that!
Part of the beauty of OneSci, is that those researchers who are kind enough to provide us with a poster rE-print allow our readers the opportunity to view the detailed experimental methods in vivid color. So, although Jeremy has completely trumped all the other editors covering the 2009 SfN conference, both in quantity and (I’ll let you be the judge of) quality -- I now present to you… THE POSTER FYI: be sure to click on the poster image to enhance
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Typewriters poised and willing...
Seeing how this is SfN season, and about 30 quadrillion posters have been prepared, printed and practiced, only to have a fleeting lifespan of a few short hours, why not give all that hard work a second lease on life by adding your poster to OneSci? It's a great opportunity to reach those who could not attend, completely missed your poster among the crowded mass of neuroscientists, or simply want to come back and reference your work. Plus you get to keep all rights associated (unlike when publishing in most academic journals). Go here for more details.
Oct. 18
Richard Morris - Presidential Lecture Love it or hate it, the Morris Water Maze is a staple of most memory labs. If you’re a PI, you probably love it. If you’re a graduate student, undergrad, technician, or any other poor soul that actually has to run the damn thing, it’s very likely that you hate it. And for how widespread its use is, it certainly has many, many limitations. Don’t tell me that plunking a rat into a pool of milky water, with an invisible platform as his only means for escape, is a pure measurement of spatial memory. The stress alone is enough to confound your measurement. But as the saying goes, it’s the worst test for spatial memory we have, except for every other test in existence…
And amidst this backdrop, the (in)famous Richard Morris took the stage for the SfN Presidential Special Lecture last Sunday. Part of me was anticipating some disgruntled grad student start chucking wet rats at the stage, while the other was excited to hear the musings from one of the greatest minds in the field. But I began to lose interest in both prospects as he slowly trudged through decades of memory research with his punctilious British accent. I’m glad I held on though, because when past gave way to present, he introduced some very exciting research that challenges what some consider dogma in learning and memory research.
Basically, he set out to refute two long-held beliefs by claiming: 1) under particular scenarios, memories can be formed to weak, sub-threshold input (that is, input unable to form a memory by itself); and 2) cortical learning – which is believed to take place only after many repetitions or long durations of time – can be rapidly acquired if new learning is integrated into a previously held network of cortical memories (i.e., an existing schema).
The first statement I didn’t find that revolutionary, as we’ve known for a long time that super-threshold stimuli paired with sub-threshold stimuli can cause a memory for the weak stimuli to be formed. However, his interpretation was quite different and actually rather novel.
The claim? Memory formation requires both a tag and interacting ligands. The former can be elicited by strong or weak stimulation. In contrast, only strong stimulation can bring about the latter. The evidence? LTP was blocked (via CaMKII inhibition) in strongly stimulated pathways. However, when a weak stimulus was applied at a later time point in a separate pathway, this weakly stimulated synapse was potentiated. The explanation? The strong stimulation causes expression of ligands that interact with CaMKII, leading to LTP. Usually, weak stimulation does not lead to ligand creation (or perhaps ligand liberation). But because the ligands were available due to the previous strong stimulation (and perhaps still present because they were inhibited from binding within the “strong pathway”), they bound to tags present in the weak pathway, leading to potentiation of theses synapses. Beautiful.
His second claim employed a clever behavioral paradigm that would take too long to get into here (good news though: it in no way involves water). But the gist is that if animals are able to integrate new information into an existing, well-learned schema, then this new knowledge can be incorporated into the cortex very rapidly. This learning is still hippocampal-dependent, however, as lesioning the hippocampus before or directly after the task abolishes learning. But the role of the hippocampus is remarkably transient (only a day or so, I believe).
After delighting us with these recent insights, he moved toward the future of memory research, and, like all great scientists before him, he has set his sights on locating the legendary engram. And while I’m hopeful that he will bring about great advances in this ongoing search, like all great scientists before him, he will probably fail to find it (as I’m sure I will if I ever take up the learning and memory torch that intrigues me so).
So, there you have it. Despite creating one of the most hated behavioral tests of our time – and being British – his brilliance and keen intellect is undeniable (just kidding, Brits). No real surprise, of course, but it’s exciting when giants of the field still have some tricks up their sleeve.
Lecture Notes - Richard Huganir. Receptors, synapses, and memories.
Apologize if notes are a bit cryptic, but I’m obviously pressed for time. I definitely don’t like to publish raw, unanalyzed regurgitation like this, but perhaps someone will find it useful - perhaps someone who sleep got the better of at 8:30am on a friggin’ Sunday!
(PO4'd = phosphorylated)
Phosphorylation of AMPA receptors can last about 30 hrs, though usually dePO4’d more quickly. Cycling of AMPA receptors in and out of membrane usually takes place over course of minutes. Cycle hundreds of times over lifetime of receptor, until degraded by proteosomes/lysosomes.
AMPAR – GluRs1-4. C-terminal = intercellular domain; this is site of PO4 regulation.
Long (1,4, 2L)and short (2,3,4s) tails of C-terminals on GluRs that are PO4’d. Examples of PO4 effects include increased open probability, conductance, insertion, and function, and decreased internalization.
LTP = PO4. LTD = dePO4 (related to [Ca2+])
Mutate PO4 sites on GluR1 and LTD is abolished, but LTP is somewhat intact. Water maze learning is intact in these mice, as well. However, retention of memory is impaired at 8hrs+.
Several postsynaptic molecules implicated in PO4 regulation (CaMKII, PKA, PKC, etc).
Though internal AMPAR are abundant in dendrites, localization to spines is much more selective and seems to be much less prevalent than NMDAR. What regulates insertion and stabilization of AMPAR? Will look at 3 proteins: GRIP1/2 and PICK1.
GRIP1&2, PICK1 (PDZ-domain proteins) = bind to c-terminal domain of GluR. All 3 proteins bind to same site, but affinity depends on PO4 state of GluR. PO4 leads to binding of GRIP1/2 and insertion into membrane (LTP); dePO4 leads to binding of PICK1 and internalization (and presumably LTD).
If delete binding site (PDZ site) in GluR2 for these proteins…?
PICK1 KO mouse: LTD abolished. Reintroducing PICK1 (via gene gun) rescues LTD ability.
GRIP1/2 conditional KO mice (embryonic lethal): Both must be KO’d to block LTP, so some redundancy between proteins. GluR2 phosphomutant mouse (can’t be PO4’d by PKC, thus doesn’t show true PO4 regulation) can’t regulate GRIP/PICK binding, hence LTD blocked.
Further questions: What maintains these changes over the long term?
Daniel Wolpert: Computational principles of human motor control
Let’s see…10am on a Sunday...5 hours sleep...Computational lecture...Presenter is British...
Hmmm, lots of factors were adding up to predict a very drab presentation (sorry, Brits. Although that accent sounds quite erudite and impressive, you can be a bit dry). But, holy crap, this lecture rocked! Daniel Wolpert does an excellent job of translating his very technical work to the masses, and gave probably the best synopsis of Baysian theory that I’ve ever heard (though I’m no statistician and can’t comment on it’s accuracy).
His conviction: brains evolved to enable interaction with the environment. Therefore, by understanding movement and how it is controlled, we can basically understand the brain.
Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as it sounds, as there are many complexities that govern movement selection and control, including multiple degrees of freedom (joints), nonlinear changes (growth of bones and muscle, changes in tension), and noise. So how does one deal with such confounds and learn to execute controlled, precise movements? By forming an internal prediction of one’s movement and their sensory consequences. Then actual sensory feedback is compared to predicted feedback, and the prediction is updated to minimize the discrepancy between actual and predicted signals (prediction error is minimized).
But how do we predict what movements we should make in the first place? This is where the Baysian rule comes into play. Predictions are based on interplay of previous experiences (memory) and current conditions (sensory data). For example, when determining where you should swing your tennis racket to hit an incoming ball, you rely on the location where the ball usually is located based on previous experience (perhaps your opponent always hits the ball to the boundary line), along with the current position and trajectory of the ball.
Whether this is actually what happens internally when we execute movements and skilled motor patterns is still very much uncertain. But there seems to be mounting evidence suggesting that prediction error feedback is present in at least some (if not all) movements.
Some other (semi-coherent) tidbits:
- Delusions of control – what allows us to label a movement as our own? Perhaps it is when our sensory feedback matches our prediction, making the two largely cancel out. If don’t have this prediction, all we have is sensory feedback and our own movements may seem like they were not initiated by us or out of our control (because error is so large).
- Escalation of force - (tit-for-tat task – apply received level of force to other, which he then applies to you, you back to him, etc, etc). Over 10 trials, force applied increased by 40% over initial level. This is hypothesized to be due to subtraction of prediction, which results in higher level of force in order to match the perceived force.
- Stereotyped movements across individuals (e.g., usually follow straight path). Some trajectories lead to less uncertainty in final position than others, and these paths have been selected for over time.
Oct. 17
Presidential lecture - Origins of abstract knowledge: numbers and geometry
How can you not be intrigued by the subject matter of this talk? Ok, I can see why some may not be, as even the mention of math sends many running for the aisles. But, I find it very intriguing. I mean, this is one of our uniquely human* characteristics that encompasses consciousness, logic, reason and a set of rules that appears be applicable to the entire physical (and perhaps metaphysical) world! So where the hell does one begin to study such a phenomenon as mathematical reasoning???
In infants, of course. And in monkeys, pigeons, mice and the lowly lab rat. This may seem counterintuitive at first glance, studying high-level human processes in beings with limited cognitive abilities. But Spelke makes a good argument for conducting such studies - and their applicability to higher-level reasoning - by investigating mechanisms found across cultures and species, and which may serve as the foundation of mathematical reasoning.
As a quick example from the talk, studies have shown that human infants (along with nonhuman animals) are able to discriminate gross values. E.g., an infant will spend a longer time looking at a visual display of dots if the quantity of dots is changed (vs. if the contrast, color, or general size of dots is changed) from a previous display. So, it appears there exists an innate mechanism for crudely evaluating sets of objects. And this “nonsymbolic” numerical ability correlates well with symbolic abilities later in life (that is, mathematical abilities such as addition – the process of combining symbols (numbers)). Thus, if we can locate where this nonsymbolic numerical evaluation resides in the brain, we have a good start point of where our abstract abilities might reside.
And this is being done. Admittedly, it’s a large jump from nonsymbolic numerical abilities to abstract mathematical reasoning, but it’s a start. And considering all the mystic phenomena involved in abstraction, I think it’s about all we can expect at this point in time. And once we understand these foundational processes, maybe we can tweak downstream (or would that be upstream?) connections to see which additional structures may contribute to this complex process. Obviously is a very intricate question, one that I certainly can't do justice. But it is exciting to see the scope of questions we are beginning to actually crack with scientific inquiry.
Possibly the only poster I will comment on during SfN
Altschuler E., Ramachandran VS. Can one observe one’s own free will?
I’ve decided that it’s pretty much a waste of time to blog about posters considering 1) My comments will likely be posted after the poster session has ended; and 2) You could probably just read the abstract to get the gist, anyway. So unless there’s some exceptionally compelling reason (flawed design, keen insight, updated results, etc), I’ll probably stay away from covering posters.
This one, however, I’ve got to share, not only because I find it rather provocative and novel, but because it will be presented again tomorrow, so you can actually swing by to see for yourself. I didn’t plan on seeing this poster in advance. In fact, after exhausting myself with poster after poster of arcane topics, I was ready to call it quits. But the sight of a guy holding a large mirror in front of a poster titled, ‘Can one observe one’s own free will?’ was more than enough to draw me in. I mean, WTF? Free will? At SfN? Do neuroscientists still believe in such a thing? I had to engage.
And then I see one of the authors is VS Ramachandran, which further intrigued me (if you somehow don’t know who this is, you must watch this). The idea behind the study is basically to combine the whole phantom limb mirror box phenomenon with out of body experiences and, arguably, free will. But instead of watching yourself being stroked or physically stimulated, the object of the experiment is to witness yourself (as a detached observer) as you “willfully” attempt to change your perception of a necker cube. So, instead of a phantom limb mirror box, it’s more like a cognitive mirror box.
Caveats? God yes. But a pretty interesting concept, nonetheless. And one that I’d at least like to try to experience for myself. Unfortunately, the proper equipment was lacking at today’s presentation. But, I’ve been promised this won’t be the case tomorrow. So, if any of you are as curious about this as I am, pay him a visit tomorrow. Don’t know exactly when he’ll be by his poster, but it’s over in the educational section (at the end of the long maze of posters – GG55 if it’s in the same place tomorrow).
Raw Lecture Notes: Technique – In vivo fluorescence microendoscopy, Mark Schnitzer
Main impediment to deep tissue imaging is photon scattering.
Chronic Imaging for > 1 year! Size small enough for mouse application.
Applications: long-term disease progression
Fluorescence microendoscopy – 2 types:
1) epi-fluorsecence – fast, simple 2) laser-scanning 2-photon: optical sectioning, possible better penetration, focal excitation
resolution ~1um
cost = cheap (but no specific figure given)
size of probe ~ 350 um
seems like cool technique, but with kinda mundane applications applied thus far in basic research. Great possibilities when combined with genetic tagging, though. Using a GFP-expressing tag, followed same neuron for 5+ weeks.
Improved version of scope allows for spine resolution (how long follow spines?)
So, can move plane of focus without moving probe.
Time resolution at least 100 Hz
Imaging in freely moving: miniaturize scope or head fix?
Miniaturize – outside laser source. Multiple objectives within miniature device. Optical commutator prevents rotational/torsion strain in fiber optic.
Application: cerebellum and coordination – looking at purkinje cells. Do neurons in microzones act together? Looked at calcium signaling and whether this is coordinated in microzone (neural synchrony).
Head-fixed approach: move on exercise ball to stabilize animal while moving. Doing work looking at microzones that I don’t follow. Pretty colors, though.
Great application when it comes to both imaging and stimulating (i.e. ChR2) with fiber optic. In vivo.
Q: How much info can one throw at an audience in 30 mins?!? A: A lot
Oct 19 2009 3:51 pm
I still don't buy into the whole Necker Cube being an indicator of free will.
Oct 20 2009 7:16 pm
Is there any topics on sleep walking in relates to short-term memories? If dreaming can initiate behavior, but the actions can not be remembered, it that consider abnormal?
Oct 23 2009 5:18 pm
Agree on the necker cube comment. And I think the author of the poster would also agree...to some extent. It seemed he was aware that his paradigm for witnessing cognitive decisions through a medium of somatic observation is flawed. I mean, I think it's a fascinating idea, to have an out-of-cognition experience analogous to an out-of-body experience, but you can't just use the same mechanism for the former as you do for the latter. Oh, and I also agree with your comment because free will doesn't exist ;)
Oct 23 2009 5:53 pm
@ Jeremy
This is just a thought, and it may only be provacative if your deteministic view of the universe stems from the idea that every molecule is following a set course that was formulated around the time of the big bang -- Say I give you a chess set and instruct you to arrange the pieces in any way you want. How might the way you arrange these pieces be completely dictated by the unfolding of the universe if the number of possible board-states (~10^120) surpasses the number of molecules in the universe or the number of nanoseconds elapsed since the big bang. Is this to say that, every molecule, on their very specific path, working in concert, will give rise to a choosing of one very specific instance of the board state.
(sorry if this thought is underdeveloped; although I try, free will is a topic I apperently cannot exercise my own free will in avoiding)Oct 23 2009 8:17 pm
The fact that the possible number of board states outnumbers the number of molecules in the universe (really???) is irrelevant. Only one of those board states will actually happen. Just as with every passing second there are an infinite number of occurances that are possible. But, of course, only one transpires (unless you're some kinda quantum physicist who believes in infinite realities and parallel universes and all that hand-waiving mumbo jumbo). What's amazing about abstraction is that we are able to conceptualize these infinite possibilities, without them ever taking place. And that is because abstraction is not confined to the physical realm. But don't go thinking that this makes abstraction free from the deterministic/probabilistic laws of the material world, because it is still controlled by physical processes. Think about that!
Oct 23 2009 8:47 pm
Let me ask a more fundamental question, do you think there is such a thing as "free" and "will" as separate terms.
"Free" approximated as "not completely predetermined"
"Will" approximated as "intrinsic motivation to make a choice"
(If you have more interesting or appropriate definitions, feel free to modify)Oct 25 2009 12:01 am
Free - no. I'm not saying that given knowedge of ALL states in a system at any given time you can say with absolute certainty what the system will look like any future state. But I am saying you can at least say what it will look like with some probability (and that is because at a quantum level you begin to deal with probabilities. However, I do believe that with some future breakthrough we will be able to account for this "uncertainty.") But, eventhough you are dealing with probabilities, the system is still bound to this probabilistic outcome, which seems like it's just another, sloppy form of determinism.
For a while, I held on to the belief that freedom may lie somewhere in that haziness of probability. For example, given state A, outcome B happens 80% of the time, while outcome C accounts for the remaining 20%. Well, what if we could impose our will to drive outcome C? This decision would require outcome B to become even more probable (or harder to overcome) in future encounters of state A, in order to "make up" the difference (and no, this is not an instance of the gambler's fallacy). I guess theoretically that could still fly, but I have definite qualms with such a structure.
Will - yes. To me, "intrinsic motivation to make a choice" = top-down control. Obviously, we make choices all the time, such as what will I attend to. BUT, these are not free choices. They're all dictated by previous experience, environment and immediate goals.Oct 25 2009 3:43 pm
Consciousness, knowledge, cognition - I concede that these things do exist in our universe, which by today's standards would be considered scientific blasphemy to perceive it as anything other than purely tangible, however with every passing second there are an infinite number of occurrences that are possible, and thus gives rise to the possibility for an event to transpire that stems from a conscious entity's own volition. In fact, I'll even go as far as proposing that consciousness and free will are necessarily intertwined.
How is it, that with all the infinite possibilities within the universe, free will is not one of them? I realize that it's an appropriate stance to use the suggestions of physics and statistics to doubt the existence of free will, so I'm willing to debate on the platform that, currently, physics is not nearly developed enough to speculate how consciousness could arise from subatomic particles. Even with the massive computational power in today's fastest super computers, we cannot even "fake" intelligence very well, let alone consciousness. Thus, our contemporary physics theorems and algorithms are extremely useful in creating powerful and reliable computational tools, because they have necessarily focused on cataloging the reliable events of matter and energy. They seem to be inadequate in suggesting how such a powerful tool should be organized to give rise to consciousness. If consciousness is currently beyond the scope of physics, how then could we use physics to determine if a conscious entity has the ability to freely make decisions.
That said, consciousness does arise from a physical apparatus. Is the thinker controlling the apparatus or is the apparatus controlling the thinker - in my opinion is the crux of the free will debate. I believe either is possible.
--- > "BUT, these are not free choices. They’re all dictated by previous > experience, environment and immediate goals." ---
I would use the word influenced instead of "dictated" - we are a product of our evolutionary past, and an organism that ignores its physical needs is not going to last very long; however, it's a possibility that with top-down control, I can put my physical needs aside for a period of time, and actively use previous physical experiences as well as previous and on-the-fly mentally fabricated experiences to accomplish goals that I've consciously set for myself.
Is it possible that free-will/consciousness could not just be a reflection of it's apparatus' physical state? - Provide an expert painter with canvas and energy and she'll create a masterpiece.
Hypothetically, say that each math digit, variable, operator, and constant are fundamental atoms in the sense that each is not able to be broken down into simpler terms, and each requires X neurons to be represented. {8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8} takes up the same amount of resources as {C = pi*r^2}, with one I have a string of numbers, with the other I have a the knowledge to determine the circumference of a circle with any possible dimension. Wouldn't this suggest that physical space and "mental" space do not necessarily coincide at a 1:1 ratio, and thus our mental representations are not strictly bound to its physical apparatus (other than to provide the thinkers brain with energy and canvas).
I think it's difficult to make any progress on the free will debate because there are no appropriate measures of free will. The definition of free will itself is poorly defined and not completely agreed upon. Furthermore, conjectures made by an entity on the limits of own capacity are always going to be speculative.Oct 26 2009 11:13 am
Why are you hung up on this infinite possibilities idea? No matter how many outcomes are possible, only one transpires. Surely you believe some "choices" are not free, even though the possible theoretical outcomes are endless (such as where a baseball will be in the next moment given its current trajectory). So why are some choices special and vulnerable to free will? Must they be of a biological nature in order to become eligible? Given all matter is made up of the same base materials, what makes biology so special? The structural organization of the molecules?
But here's the real question: how exactly does free will influence the material world? I mean, can you open ion channels simply by willing them to do so? Because that is what we're talking about here - perturbing nature using only your mind.
Your argument about mental space holding more information than physical space is definitely interesting, but any mathematical formula, artistic masterpiece, technological breakthrough, etc are simply discoveries of things that already existed in the natural world. They may be put together in novel ways, true. But in a sense, they always existed. The brain is beautiful in that it can store massive amounts of information, create networks linking such info, and sometimes form a bridge between independent networks that allows information to be linked in new ways. But there is nothing ethereal about such things. Surely you could program a computer to do this.
Thinking about mental space messes with me good, though. Now there's a real philosophical question: How the hell do we mentally experience...anything?!? How are these physical processes translated into feelings? Faced with this, it's hard not to believe we have some kind of metaphysical powers. But I am an empiricist (in the scientific sense), and thus firmly believe that mental experience is a passive process dictated by physical events. Always. And since I've never heard convincing evidence that physical events are anything but predetermined...Oct 26 2009 11:30 am
I do believe I can open up an ion channel in my brain, or at least a sufficient amount to access the info I need. Watch this - there are some ion channels that represent the Nth letter of the alphabet corresponding to the product of 3* 3 = N that I'm gunna open (I havent figured it out yet, wait for it, BAM, got it). Now u try! Or not, it's up to you.
Oct 26 2009 4:59 pm
But you didn't freely open that ion channel. It only opened in response to the query of 3*3. And that query was formulated in response to your need of an example to illustrate an instance where you control some process. And the form of that example was taken from prior experience where you knew one could set up a system with a set, predictable outcome. And probably due to your recent foray into math, the nature of your example was mathematical. It was all just based on prior experience and current drives. You did not open that ion channel, the past did. p.s. if you've come to believe that the product of two numbers is a letter of the alphabet, I suggest switch out of your math course asap!